is philosophical theology that shapes the now extended narra tive, moving us beyond the ways in which al-Farabi and Ibn Sina employed the model of logical deduction to present creating as a timeless and even necessary emanation from the One. For while emanation is a metaphor that can move in diverse directions, as it clearly does in Plotinus, the deductive model inhibited a clear elucidation of "the distinction," since the initial premise of a logical deduction differs from its consequences only by its pre-eminent position. Even Ibn Rushd, who had little patience with al-Ghazali's critique of "the philosophers" in Islam, had even less hope that Ibn Sina's scheme, adapted from al-Farabi, could elucidate the act of creating. Yet his own attempt to clarify that, while subtly intimating Islamic tradition and Q uranic precedent in its focus on "practical reason," set the stage for further development more than it resolved the outstanding issues. This development would follow Islamic thinkers from Andalusia back to the heartland of the Levant, in the persons of Suhrawardi (1154-1191), Ibn cArabi (d. 1240), and Sadra al-Din al-Shirazi [Mulla Sadra] (1572-1640). All of these thinkers are explicitly beholden to Ibn Sina, yet each endeavors to adapt his philosophical mode of inquiry to articulate the relation between creation and the creator. So their agenda, singly and cumulatively, brings explicitly theological issues to the fore; however each o f them is still taken up with philosophical concerns ancillary to that central task: Suhrawardi with epistemology, Ibn cArabi in searching for ways to articulate so unique a relation, and Mulla Sadra with bringing a bevy of philosophical issues under the ambit of existing as resulting from the One who is existing.
As the last of this trio, Mulla Sadra is hardly intelligible without his two predecessors in the Levant, so these efforts to identify his specific position and contribution demand that we present their achievements in the process of elucidating his. Yet economy demands that Suhrawardi and Ibn cArabi be included by way of background briefing, as we present specific issues in Mulla Sadra's thought. Superb explications of Suhrawardi are readily accessible in the work of John I offer excerpts from our translation from Mulla Sadra's Asfar to convey the flavor of his mode o f inquiry, utilizing as well the work of Christian Jambet,9 illuminating articles by Hamid Dabashi,10 Hossein Ziai,11 and Seyyed Hossein Nasr.12 A lasting gratitude is due to Henry Corbin, whose pioneering work opened this field to so many, most of whom will also endeavor to reflect the particular orientation he celebrated in Ishraqi ["oriental"] thought. It should be clear by now that this later extension of Islamic philosophy enjoys far less publicity than the earlier Peripatetic phase; yet, unless it is brought into focus, to show how it both develops and alters earlier themes, any presentation of Islamic philosophy will unwittingly falsify the picture. It has surely been the case, however, that short of a distinctly "postmodern" sensibility, philosophers have found their inquiries bordering on the esoteric, and are thus hardly fit for sober philosophical elucidation. Indeed, Corbin's presentation had the effect of intensifying those fears, so the guides whom I have indicated are intent on offering an alternative view of their work, as am I. Yet the fact remains that any attempt to elucidate the ineffable relation between creator and creatures, which is the central task of these thinkers, challenges categories exclusively tailored to created things.
The Prim acy o f Existing over Essence
Mulla Sadra is best known for taking issue with Suhrawardi, and insisting that existing take precedence over essence in explicating the metaphysical composition of creatures, as well as their mode of emanating from the Creator. But the very distinction between existing and essence, as well as the role it played in offering a way of identifying creatures as created, anchors our narrative in Ibn Sina, and shows the inherent continuity in a philosophical saga whose second phase often appears to be very different from the first. Yet both, as we shall see, were shaped by Ibn Sina. The overall context is Mediterranean, and lest this sound banal, we need only remind ourselves that the bulk of western reflection on medieval philosophy was crafted in western and northern Europe. So the standard accounts we have received spoke little of the philosophy (or the philosophers) in the Muslim or Jewish traditions, yet we have found that they were, where possible, in contact with one another, and beholden to one another.13 Yet all three traditions had to con tend with Plotinus' radical adaptation of Aristotle to focus on the origination of the universe, retrospectively seen as paradigmatically "neo-Platonist." For it had come to occupy the philosophical center stage, so that later thinkers who sought to incorporate a revealed creator into the Aristotelian worldview would spontaneously begin with a Plotinian scheme, with which some found it necessary to contest. This is especially clear in al-Farabi, who adopts the emana tion pattern quite directly to signal the relation between "the First" and all that emanates from It; that is, everything else.14 Ibn Sina modifies the scheme inherited from al-Farabi (and so from Plotinus), and introduces his initial version of the essence/existing distinction to clarify how al-Farabi's "First," now Ibn Sina's "necessary being,"
13 John Inglis, ed., Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism, and Christianity (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003 relates to everything else: being possible in itself, when it exists, becomes 'necessary' by the existence it derives from the One, who is distinguished from all else as necessary being. It will prove crucial to the later development of the essence/existing distinction that this One, ancestrally related to Plotinus' One (explicitly "beyond being") is now denominated "necessary being." The Jewish interlocutor in this discussion, Moses Maimonides, was well-instructed by Ibn Sina, yet took issue with his apparently seamless adaptation of the Farabian/Plotinian scheme to display the free creation of the universe by the one God, now revealed in the Torah. In so reacting, he may well have been emboldened by al-Ghazali's trenchant critique of Ibn Sina's apparently necessitarian picture of creation, for Maimonides' cultural context was thoroughly Islamic.15
The The First Existent is the First Cause of the existence of all the other existents. It is free of every kind of deficiency, whereas there must be in everything else some kind of deficiency. . . but the First is free of all their deficiencies. Thus its existence is the most excellent and preceded every other existence. No existence can be more excel lent than or prior to its existence. Thus it has the highest kind of excellent existence and the most elevated rank of perfect existence. Therefore its existence and substance cannot be adulterated by non-existence at all. It can in no way have existence potentially, and there is no possibility whatever that it should not exist.16
He continues with a host o f nearly equivalent statements, capped by: "it is the existent for whose existence there can be no cause, . . . and it is impossible for anything else to have the existence it has." Note that he has not taken the boldest step of all: to identify the First in what it is (its essence) with existing, for he still speaks of the First as "having" existence. But he has taken us to the brink, by emphasizing how utterly different is the "First Cause" from all that emanates from it; that is, from all else. Ibn Sina, with Maimonides in his wake, makes that further precision.
Ibn Sina takes the next step of integrating the original (creator/ creature) distinction into the very metaphysical "composition" of every created thing, thereby offering a signal innovation to Aristotle's metaphysics of substance. This may indeed reflect his awareness of the aporia that Edward Booth has identified as central to the Aristotelian tradition: that between the essence of a thing and the individual thing itself.17 Aristotle had, o f course, taken pains to identify the individual existing thing with its essence, precisely to avoid Plato's notorious "third man" argument; much as he had insisted that the paradigm for substance is the individual existing (even better, living) thing. Yet when it came to his exposition of substance in book Lambda (VII) of the Metaphysics, the best he could do in explicating substance was to identify it with form .18 So in the end, if you will, Plato won, despite Aristotle's opening polemic (in the same book) against Plato's apparent insouciance for individual things. This aporia recurred throughout the commentary tradition, which largely attempted to suppress it rather than address it; much as it will emerge in the course of an introductory class. Nor did Ibn Sina himself succeed in neutralizing it, though the distinction he proposed helped others to resolve it. Like Aristotle, in other words, he has the essence in mind, but unlike Aristotle, he needs to offer an explicit account for its existing only in individuals. That is, of course, Aristotle's anti-Platonic assertion, but he was unable to explain how it works; while Ibn Sina saw clearly that Aristotle's paradigmatic individual existence cannot be accounted for by the essence itself. So, in what we might dub a neo-Platonic manner, Ibn Sina identified essences with possible beings, and asserted that, "as regards the possible existent, . . . it necessarily needs some other thing to render its existing in actuality." 19
As if to show how the distinction for which he is reaching reflects the original distinction of creator from creatures, Ibn Sina draws the contrast in philosophical language. There is one alone whose existence is necessary, and that One, "the first, has no essence [mahiyya] except in its existence [anniyya]" So necessary being has no essence [mahiyya] except that it be necessary being, and this is its existence [anniyya] .20 By proposing another term for the essence o f necessary being, dhat, Ibn Sina intended to remove consideration of its whatness from that attending creatures, whose quiddities [the Latin answer to the question 'quid est?, or 'what is it?', as mahiyya functions in Arabic] will ideally be articulated in the normal form o f genus/species (e.g., 'speaking animal'). C on trary to the essence of the one necessary being, however, Ibn Sina's insistence that all other essences require something else to bring them into existence introduces a new mode of composition into all creatures, beyond that of matter and form, which he presumes throughout: one of essence [mahiyya] with some other factor that causes the individual thing to be. That factor is never identified by Ibn Sina; the elusive term anniyya expresses the "real existence of a particular individual" rather than identifying what it is that makes the individual exist. Yet by distinguishing what something is from that which makes it be, he seeks to introduce a notion of essence without any qualification: "mere essence," best parsed as what the normal formula (e.g., 'speaking animal') signifies. Neither universal nor particular, essence is taken simply as what can be predicated of individuals, in which it alone exists, thereby formulating what Aristotle was reaching for. (C. S. Peirce shows how the modern proclivity to identify essences with universals misses the point of the relation peculiar to predication; for in saying that Socrates is a man, we are not saying something universal about him, but simply stating what he-in all his individuality-is.)
So far, so good; a brilliant stab at the kind of reformulation of Aristotle required to accommodate the grounding fact that all such substances are created. Yet some infelicities remain. One respects identifying such essences with possibility, and doing so in such a way that "they" receive existence, which he would name (in Arabic) as an "accident," or something which "happens" to essence. Ibn Rushd fastens onto this error, which any student of philosophy can quickly identify: if existing is an accident, there would have had to be something in which it could inhere. But "simple essences" cannot be said to be, nor is it possible for there to be anything to receive existence. Later commentators on Ibn Sina will neutralize the aporiae stemming from a simple-minded identification of existing with an ordinary accident, but the dilemma imbedded in the language of "receiving existence" will perdure.21 The identification of "simple essences" with possibility, and especially with "possibilities," extends to discussions in our day, so Ibn Sina cannot be said to have the last word, either on the subject itself, of relating created to uncreated and creating being, or on the distinction intended to suggest that relation without pretending adequately to display it.
Ibn Sina's distinction set the stage not only for comparing essence with existing, but also for employing the distinction itself to find something of their source mirrored in creatures. Yet since the essence of a thing corresponds quite simply to what it is, and revelation tells us that things are created according to their kinds, essences structure the created universe without bespeaking its dynamic. So the obvious candidate for articulating the founding relation of creation would seem to be existing. Yet when it came to articulating that relation, Suhrawardi contented himself with the classic metaphor of light to model the issuing forth of creatures from the creator.22 Moreover, in this respect, Mulla Sadra parted company with his distinguished master, Mir Damad, who may be considered the founder of the illustrious "school of Isfahan" in which Mulla Sadra can be located.23 Hamid Dabashi offers this translation of Mir Damad's way of arguing for the primacy of essence over existing:
The essence of a thing, in whatever shape or format it might be, is the occurrence o f that very thing in that vessel; not the attachment or appendage of something to it. . . . Yet the bringing into being of a thing in itself is the bringing-into-being of that thing in that thing.24
Taken by themselves, these words do little more than re-state philosophers' general predilection for essences as grounding "sci entific" inquiry into things by their kinds. Little or nothing is said about the "bringing-into-being" of things. So we might be prepared for Mulla Sadra's passionate recounting of his "conversion" from this default position:
In the earlier days I used to be a passionate defender of the theist [belief that] the quiddities are extramentally real while existence is but a mental construct, until my Lord gave me guidance and let me see His own demonstrations. All of a sudden my spiritual eyes were opened and I saw with utmost clarity that the truth was just the contrary of what philosophers in general had held. Praise be to God who, by the light o f intuition, led me out of the darkness of the groundless idea and firm ly established me upon the thesis which would never change in the present world and the hereafter. As a result [I now hold that] the individual existences of things are primary realities, while the quiddities are the "permanent archetypes that have smelt even the fragrance of existence." The individual existences are nothing but beams of light radiated by the true Light which is the absolutely self-subsistent existence. The absolute existence in each of its individualized forms is characterized by a number of essential properties and intelligible qualities. And each of these properties and qualities is what is usually known as quiddity.25
As we shall see, M ulla Sadra's account depends directly on Suhrawardi's master metaphor of light to depict the relation between self-subsistent existence and existents, yet identifies the active prin ciple with existence itself. So it seems accurate to say that his move to assert the primacy of existing offers an attempt to articulate the relation between existing things and their source. We shall also have to explore the way he identifies essences with "permanent archetypes that have smelt even the fragrance o f existence" in an effort to ascertain what such "things" might be. So let us examine his sober prose rendition of this spectacular "conversion" by attending to the introductory remarks of his magnum opus, the Asfar, as they locate this inquiry in a wisdom tradition that sees our life and inquiry as a journey with significant stages. Introduction. Concerning our knowledge of philosophy with its primary divisions, its goals and its dignity.
Know that philosophy is able to perfect the human soul by bringing it to know the reality of existents according to their proper essences, as well as accurately assessing their existence by way of proofs grasped by the mind; or else accepted by tradition, as befits the majority of human beings. Now if you wanted, you could say that the order of the universe is intelligibly ordered according to human capacity, which can attain to a certain qualified resemblance [tashbih] of the Creator most High, since human beings came to be as something kneaded from dough-that is, [by way of] intelligible form together with created sensible matter-"We created man from clay, from earthy substance duly fashioned" (15:26). Yet there is also a dimension o f the soul which remains independent and separate, capable of being attracted to wisdom, as is the case with the party of the zealous and whoever is endowed with power to continue inquiry into things free of matter, and such intellectual endeavors.
For inquiry with these aspirations [has the effect of] drawing out the soul, along the lines o f the form o f existence, to [perceive] its order, its expression and its perfection, after which it can become knowing and rational and conformed to knowledge of things seen not in matter but in their forms, thereby adorning, [21] shaping and embellishing the soul. Indeed, this sort of wisdom is that to which the chief Messenger-praise and blessing to him-aspires as he asks in his invocation to his Lord, saying: "Lord, show us things as they really are." And also to the friend of God [Abraham]-may he be praised and blessed, when he asked: "Lord, grant me wisdom" (4:83). Now the wisdom in question must be right judgment regarding existence, attending to what may be needed to conceive things properly.
So it is clear that such an inquiry will entail a spiritual journey, as intimated in the very title of the work itself, and clarified in these introductory remarks. As we shall see, each thing is linked with its creator by its very existence, so the link itself will share in the inexpressibility of God. In this way, a philosophical inquiry into existence cannot be a merely conceptual (or "abstract") endeavor. It is fascinating to note how carefully Mulla Sadra proceeds, altering ways of inquiry already standard to "philosophers," notably Ibn Sina, to meet his stringent demands for articulating existence as the link of creatures to their creator.
So it seems that the best way one can proceed here is by an interior path, since there can be no definition of existence, and so no demonstration regarding it. For definition and demonstration can only proceed when the definitions concern those things between which we can distinguish [by weighing them] on proper scales. But what if one must believe what one cannot perceive, without perceiving anything else preceding it? So, for example, when we wish to know whether intelligence exists, we must first have arrived at yet other beliefs, yet will certainly come in the end to a belief without any other belief preceding it [27], indeed one necessarily [imbedded] in the soul, offering a primary elucidation from the intelligence itself-like saying that something is a thing.26 For a thing has nothing contrary to it; while two contraries cannot come together, nor can one be elevated above the other in position or according to position, for were one to reason that way, one would be entering the realm of conceptions.27 Yet here there is no need to begin conceiving prior conceptions, as one must in any [sequence of] conceptions, for [any such sequence] will certainly be able to be traced back to an initial conception-like necessity, possibility or existence-not dependent upon a preceding concep tion. Now these conceptions, and those similar to them, provide trustworthy meanings at the very center of the intellect, inscribed in [our] intelligence by the inscription of the first intelligence [fir] . So when one intends to clarify these meanings by way of kalam, that can act as a stimulus to the mind, [turning them into] objects of attention by focusing on them as significant signs among the other items at the center of the intelligence. Indeed, these [conceptions] are better known than others, since they do not come to the mind from things.
So existence will partake o f the prim ary notions available quite naturally to intellect, yet there will be further peculiarities with this "notion" which must be more than a notion, since what it expresses cannot properly be expressed in a predicate form. For that reason Ibn Sina's strategy o f articulating existence as something which "comes to" [arada, accidit] the essence will not do, for existing must be more interior to existing things than a feature of them could ever be. One way to see this is to remark on the inherently ambiguous character of the term 'exists' as we apply it. And closely linked to that, we shall notice his recourse to participation. He begins chapter 2 by announcing its subject. way. This impression does not require better known things to bring it about" (Metaphysics, trans. Marmura, 22; Ibn Sina, al-Shifat, 5. 27 Mulla Sadra is following Aristotle, who insisted that substance has no contrary, though predicates will always have them.
Given that essences participate in existence in such a w ay that existence brings them nearer to the first beings, it is also the case that intelligence mediates between one existent and another by way o f relation and similarity, while nothing can mediate between an existent and nothingness. For if existents were unable to participate in a [single] understanding, so that they would differ in all respects, their situation would be like that of existence with respect to nothingness: no relation at all between them. . . . But we have here before us an infinity of things that can be understood, though one can only consider each one of them singly, asking whether it participates [36] in existence or not; unless it were [clear that] its existence is participated, so one would not need to inquire into it. . . . Regarding existence being attributed to what is below it in gradated ways-that is, regarding their being unities or one or eternal or perduring-existence in some existing things is determined by their essence, while in others it issues from them by way of nature, while in still others it will be perfected and powerful. Now the existence which has no cause has primacy over what takes its existence from another, and so is naturally prior to all existing natural things. Similarly the existence of each one of the active intelligences is prior to that of subsequent ones, as the existence of substance is prior to the existence of accidents.
The Aristotelian way of speaking of "systematically ambiguous" discourse, which Aquinas will ennoble as "analogous," proceeds "according to prior and posterior" 28 Mulla Sadra explores this route to help us see how terms used equivocally may lead to unambiguous understanding.
[37] Indeed, without considering existence, there can be no priority or posteriority, since being prior or posterior, perfect or deficient, strong or weak, are found in existents, which properly give rise to them without [needing] any other thing. For with regard to things and essences taken in themselves, their existences do not properly belong to them, as you saw again quite clearly in this chapter, following the investigation of such ambiguities in this book, where it has already been clarified how existencein so far as it can be understood-is something common to be predicted of existing things according to differences and not merely conventionally.
Yet the most telling ambiguity in the term "existence" stems from its ordinary use to identify individuals, by contrast with its more "philosophical" use as "common existence," an ambiguity already present in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Mulla Sadra takes great pains to separate these two meanings in chapter 3: " That common existence, [known] spontaneously, is equivalent to intellectual existence, and so differs from what subsists or is individual." So we [must] say: this distinction between things and existence is not part of our comprehension of existing things, but involves attempting to grasp them together in general terms, which is like melding two discourses. For the being o f an existent may or may not involve things other than existence, but its existence will shine forth in the measure that what is fitting to it emerges from the properties o f a thing rather than from an attempt to comprehend existence itself. What Ibn Sina says in his [book on] metaphysics (al-Shifa') clarifies this: "necessary existence is already understood by the very [expression] 'necessary existence,' just as unity is already understood by the very [expression] 'one'" (al-Shifa 1.6). Now one can understand by this either that the essence of necessary existence is like that of humanity, or that it is an essence quite different from other essences like humanity; it simply is what it is: necessary existence. Recall what we understood about unity: whatever anything is-something or its very self or humanity, it remains one. So let it be said: we must distinguish unity or existent as essences attributed to something, from unity and existent in so far as a thing is one and existent.
This last animadversion should remind us of Plotinus' insistence that we cannot even say that the One is one! So existing, as what links the One with the many, will share in that same ineffability. Yet now, it appears, Mulla Sadra is ready to say what can be said.
Moreover, the following corollaries must be noted as well: should I be asked whether existence is existent or not, the answer should be that it is existent in the sense that the true reality of existence is existent: that is, existence is what existentializes. This can be confirmed by what is found in renowned commentaries, namely that under standing a thing need not involve an understanding of speech, for example, unless there be an accident shared within the field. Yet were one to consider the derived expression to be adequate to the thing [itself], matter would be transformed into a proper potency. [42] Hence that thing to which laughter belongs is human, which necessarily affirms the thing as what it is; for to speak of the thing in interpreting what follows upon [such considerations] can show clearly why the mind which speaks of it returns to it, which seems to be the way some recent thinkers consider the union o f accidents with accidentality, but that cannot be verified.
[43] Yet those allusions regarding the soul and the separate substances above it as unadulterated individuals and pure existences, presented by the divine shaykh [Ibn cArabi], might lead in that direction. But I cannot understand how he could be thought to have denied that existence is something happening to individuals, or if so, whether the contradic tion is only verbal.
In other words, Ibn cArabI cannot elide the central insight of Ibn Sina regarding the crucial distinction of creator from creatures, as between that which exists "by right," and that to which existing is granted. Mulla Sadra attempts to express this existing yet more intimately:
So we [must] say: if existence were not an individual true reality [haqiqa] , distinct from the properties [a thing has], how could essences differing in themselves ever be described? Or different levels [of things]? Yet they are described in this way. Now necessary existence has no need of a cause to be what it is, while the existence of possible [beings] differs from it essentially. Nor can there be any doubt of the difference, by way of negation or privation, between need and lack of need regarding the necessity of essences or levels of essence. Therefore there can be no doubt that there is in every existent something beyond its properties: namely, understanding it to exist. Otherwise, how could existences differ essentially, as even those who go astray suggest; or [how could there be] different levels [of being] , as yet other sects have noticed? Yet sheer generality, by analogy with properties, yields species without any differences___To realize this, [know that] existence itself establishes the essence, for a thing is not established in its essence unless there be a way of proposing the essence be established. . . .
As the master [Ibn Sina] said in his inquiries: . . . existence which has emanated from another has its being dependent on that other, and subsists in it as though bestowed from another which subsists according to an existence necessary in itself (al-Shifa' 1.6). Now the subsistence proper to a thing cannot be separated from it since it is proper to it. And he says in another place concerning this: either existence requires another and so is in need of another to subsist, or it is so well endowed with it that its subsistence is proper to it. So it would not be true [in general] that existence exists requiring another and depend on it as though it were not true that existence [also] exists well-endowed and independent, without subsisting from another but rather as an unlimited true reality. I say that a sensible intelligent person, exercising the power of intuition, understands from this discussion why we [47] resist proposing a demonstration of these matters, notably with respect to that time in which all possible existents and ordered individuals depend on necessary existence for their consideration and their nature, along with the diffusion and blockage of light which does not subsist independently with respect to its very essence [huwiyya] While there can be no demonstration of these matters, primarily since existing defies definition, we are nonetheless led to realize that we cannot understand created things properly without a sustained attempt to grasp the internal link they have with the creator in their very existing. Yet while this mode o f inquiry exceeds the bounds of philosophical inquiry as normally practiced by Islamic philosophers like Ibn Slna, it is arguable that they too realized that an authentically philosophical search must move into these more esoteric arenas.29 Yet Mulla Sadra's inspiration is clearly Ibn cArabI. It is that connection which needs to be more thoroughly explored.
Ibn cArabi: " rationalizing mystic"
If Suhrawardi provides the indispensable background for Mulla Sadra, Ibn cArabi offers the bridge from Suhrawardi to Mulla Sadra, by way of intensifying the "therapeutic" role of philosophy signaled to us by Pierre Hadot, in essays Arnold Davidson introduces with a phrase from Wittgenstein: "philosophy as a way of life."30 Sajjad Rizvi adopts the descriptor "rationalizing mystic" from Philip Merlan's way of depicting "later Neoplatonists, [to convey] absolute trans parency between the knower, the known, and knowledge itself" in such a cognitive relation to the creator God. Indeed, what specifies this cognitive manner of relating to the creator, as articulated in "illuminationist [ishraqi] philosophy, is its integration of spiritual practice into the pursuit of wisdom."31 What is sought here is a way of articulating the relation itself between creator and creatures, parallel to that between existence and existents, a relation which one knows to be unique, unassimilable to relations between existents. Here the celebrated "distinction," articulated (albeit differently) in Ibn Sina and in Aquinas, is intensified by insisting that the One alone exists. Ibn cArabi uses Quranic language to intimate the manner of bestowing a share of that existence on existents: He originates and brings back (85:13). While this verse had been understood to refer to "God's bringing people back at the resurrection," Ibn cArabi offers a more metaphysical reading linked to the conserving dimension of creating:
There is no existent thing to which the Real gives exis tence without finishing with giving it existence. Then that existent thing considers God and sees that He has come back to giving existence to another entity. So it continues perpetually and endlessly.32
God's creating takes the form of command, the "engendering com mand" God said: 'be ' and it came to be (16:40) . Though the Qur'an is largely concerned with God's "prescriptive commands," the "Be that When the cosmos becomes articulated as the words of the All-Merciful, it reflects three fundamental realities from which it emerges-wujud [existence], the Highest Barzakh, and nonexistence. . . . Just as the Highest Barzakh brings together wujud and nonexistence, so also the cosmic barzakh brings together spirits and bodies. Through its very essence, a barzakh possesses the properties of the two sides.34
In other words, we are focusing on the ineffable relation between creator and creatures, to which Ibn cArabI finds an epistemological parallel in the imagination, posed as it is between intellect and sense, spirit and bodies. Yet the key to this partitioning is the unique relation to the creator.
Salman Bashier has delineated the key function of the barzakh as attempting to elucidate the relation between creator and creatures as the space o f union-in-difference which characterizes such a form of knowing.35 Identified Qub anically as the barzakh, or the isthmus between heaven and earth, it represents the limit of human understanding which also serves to relate it to its source. As such, it is the "third entity," represented epistemologically as "the perfect man." This intermediate place is identified by Ibn cArabI with the "imaginal world," referring to the way in which "the cosmos is real, but its reality consists in the fact that it is/is not the real concerning God and the world is "Yes and no," or, "He/ not He" (huwa la huwa). This is "because the cosmos is imagination, and imagination is that which stands in an intermediary situation between affirmation and denial. About it one says 'both this and that' or 'neither this nor that.' The universe is neither Being nor nothingness, or both Being and nothingness.'"37
How else can a believer refer to created things, except to allude to their emanating from a creator as the continuing source of their being? Yet since what links them, being, cannot be a feature of things, we have no direct way of expressing the relating of creatures to their creator beyond (as Aquinas expresses it) to insist that their being must be a "being-to-the-creator."
Yet such a situation cannot but be paradoxical, since authentic knowledge of the source of being must be of One beyond our compre hension: "the possessors of knowledge see that their reason delimits everything that it knows, while the divine Essence remains beyond delimitation. Thus they come to know that the only knowledge about God that reflection can provide to reason is the knowledge of what God is not" 38 This carefully constructed sentence deserves attention: knowledge, for reason, can only be "knowledge about" something, whereas the knowledge that seekers seek is "knowledge o f" the One, which can only be parsed by reason as "knowledge of what God is not" Bashier cites Nicholas of Cusa at this point, for whom "the Essence of God can never be found, since it is beyond all limits,"39 yet Ibn cArabi highlights this limit-situation by inviting a dialectical exchange between those in his tradition who declare God incomparable [tanzih] and those who declare God comparable [tashbih] : "this attitude holds that each of the contradictory views regarding the knowledge of the Real can be correct from a differ ent perspective, despite the fact that the two views are exclusive to each other. The attitude of complementarity comes very close to the true knowledge of the Real." Another way of putting this is to parse Ibn cArabI as "saying that there is something that ties the real to creation, but that this something is not something added to 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., 136. 39 Ibid., 137. the real and creation. He is actually stating that there is something and that this something is nothing; . . . the closest definition of the limit situation."40 So readers are taxed to follow this philosopher into regions which lie beyond the articulation to which philosophers have become accustomed, a space epitomized by Ibn Rushd. Yet what impels philosophy beyond itself is the call to articulate the faith assertion of free creation. This exercise in philosophical theology itself displays the contours of that hybrid inquiry.
However difficult it may be for contemporary philosophers to follow such a hybrid inquiry, especially those who cannot avail themselves of a faith tradition of free creation, all could nevertheless be assisted by Chittick and Bashier to move beyond the stereotype of Ibn cArabi as a "monist"-that is, one who elides "the distinction" of creatures from creator. For the precise function of the barzakh is to highlight the relation between creator and creatures, which however paradoxical it may be for us to formulate, remains a rela tion, even though comparing it to an ordinary relation between creatures effectively elides creation itself-as Maimonides saw so clearly. On this reading, what makes Ibn cArabI so radical is not a heretical denial of "the distinction" between the One and all-that-is, but rather a thoroughgoing attempt to keep that distinction from being so trivialized that the One ceases to be "the One" or "the Real," and becomes "the biggest thing around." 41 Yet to negotiate such paradoxical articulation demands the practice of a set of "spiritual exercises," as we have noted to be the hallmark of classical Hellenic philosophy as well as of later Islamic philosophical theology, yet already intimated in the later allegorical writings of Ibn Slna.
Concluding Remarks
There are many other features of Mulla Sadra's thought worthy of attention, for which clear treatment can be found in Jambet, Nasr, Ziai, Rizvi, and most recently in Bonmariage.42 Hamid Dabashi43 gives especially illuminating "deep background" on the sociopolitical situation in Isfahan and Shiraz, which helps us to appreciate the difficulties which philosophers faced in this time o f otherwise spectacular development and opulence. I have focused on the relation between creator and creatures, and Mulla Sadra's identification of existence as the philosophical strategy for articulating that relation in order to offer some suggestions how his inquiry may attend to issues that continue to bedevil philosophical theology.
